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Abstract 
The present study uses a novel measure of over performance (percent deviation 
from career average) to analyze the contract year phenomenon in the NBA. Historically, 
the literature has pointed toward over performance across almost all statistical measures 
of performance. However, previous research has assumed that all players are universally 
affected by the presence of a contract year in the same manner. The present study finds 
significant results that contradict previous research by dividing the sample of players into 
subgroups by age, career PER and position. Furthermore, the results of this paper’s 
statistical analysis illustrate the first examples of systematic underperformance in a 
contract year. More specifically, this study finds that for certain subsets of players, 
shooting percentage, usage percentage and field goal attempts decrease in the presence of 
a contract year. 
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1. Introduction 
 Long-term guaranteed contracts are believed to facilitate opportunistic behavior 
by incentivizing systematic variation of effort levels (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). This 
behavior can manifest itself either in increased effort directly before contract negotiations 
(ex ante strategic behavior) or decreased effort immediately after (ex post opportunistic 
behavior or “shirking”). For example, if an employee in an organization knows his salary 
is going to be renegotiated in the near future, he has added motivation to perform well in 
that time period. In order to boost his performance, the employee is likely to raise his 
effort level. Correspondingly, once his contract is set and income is guaranteed, his 
incentives work the opposite way. His motivation to perform well decreases, thus his 
effort level falls as well. While ex post opportunistic behavior is undoubtedly an 
important subject, this paper focuses exclusively on the existence and forms of ex ante 
strategic behavior. In sports, strategic behavior in the last year of a current contract is 
known as the contract year phenomenon.  
 Sports provide a unique forum for analyzing this type of strategic behavior. In 
organizations it can be difficult to directly and accurately measure performance and 
obtain contract data on the subject. Conversely, sports provide a variety of statistics that 
can be used to analyze performance. Furthermore, contract lengths and amounts in sports 
are publicly available, allowing researchers to analyze performance relative to the 
contract cycle.1  
This paper explores strategic behavior in the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) for a variety of reasons including contract structures, player involvement, variety 
1 The contract cycle refers to the stages of a player’s current contract. The last year of the contract is called 
the contract year. The years following the signing of a contract up until the start of the last year represent 
the remaining portion of the contract cycle.  1  
                                                        
 
of performance measurements and depth of previous research. While some research has 
been conducted on the NBA, much of the literature on strategic behavior in professional 
sports focuses on Major League Baseball (MLB). This is presumably a result of the 
intermittent, pitch-by-pitch nature of baseball, which lends itself to simple and accurate 
measurement. Also, the sabermetrics revolution in baseball has provided economists with 
more thorough measurements of performance, which allows statisticians to quantify a 
greater proportion of the game.2 While baseball performance is relatively simple to 
measure, basketball is much more complex and provides numerous challenges for 
empirical testing.  
Basketball by nature is more continuous and individual performance is more 
difficult to assess numerically. NBA players constantly impact the game both on offense 
and defense in ways that presently cannot be calculated. To illustrate this point, imagine a 
basketball player in a game situation. He helps his team by setting a screen to create an 
easy shot for a teammate. Defensively, he rotates to help his teammates and contest a 
shot, thereby decreasing the probability that the offensive player scores. While this player 
is clearly impacting his team in a positive manner on both offense and defense, neither of 
these contributions factor into any performance measures.  
These examples not only highlight the difficulty in trying to accurately measure 
player performance but also reveal the importance of effort. In basketball (more so than 
in baseball) effort plays an important role in determining performance. While giving 
maximum effort in baseball will no doubt boost player performance in some ways, it’s 
arguable whether trying harder will help you hit a curveball (Jean, 2010). Baseball 
2 Another added bonus for empirical research in MLB is the widely agreed upon performance measures. As 
will be discussed later, some of the ambiguity that has arisen in studying strategic behavior in the NBA is 
due to varying measures of performance.  2  
                                                        
 
players are rarely physically pushed to limits where effort plays a defining role in 
determining performance. Rather, skill and talent control performance to a greater degree. 
In basketball, effort’s impact is much more obvious. In the earlier example of a player in 
a game, both of his contributions are directly related to effort level. By playing harder, 
the player can set a more effective screen and make his opponent’s shot more difficult.  
While it is possible to look at a basketball player and visually assess how hard he 
is playing, we cannot directly measure effort. As a result, most researchers resort to using 
player performance statistics as a proxy for effort. In doing so, they make the assumption 
that increased effort leads to better performance. However, the degree to which effort and 
performance are correlated is debatable. While exploring the strength of this correlation, 
Fort (2003) raised the question of how effort levels actually manifest themselves in 
performance. Berri and Krautmann (2006) highlighted two ways in which a conscious 
change in effort could be expressed: during games and outside of games. They 
understood that for strategic behavior to exist, players must be able to deliberately 
manipulate their effort level. When considering on court changes in effort level, it is 
unclear to what degree players realistically have control over their effort (Fort, 2003). For 
example, it is dubious whether increased effort allows a player to make a greater 
percentage of fade-away jump shots or convert free throws at a higher rate (Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006). On the other hand, the degree of control over effort outside of games 
intuitively seems to be much greater. Players have the choice to work hard in their 
offseason preparation, practices, weight room activities and dietary habits. Berri and 
Krautmann (2006) use the example of Vin Baker to highlight the effect of work ethic 
outside of games. Baker was a perennial NBA All-Star from 1995 to 1998. After signing 
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an $87 million contract in 1999, his production deteriorated quickly. His per game 
scoring averages fell from 16.2 to 12.2 to 5.2 in the following successive seasons. Paul 
Westphal, Vin Baker’s coach during his decline, attributed this drop off to a “lack of 
professionalism off the court” (quoted in O’Neil, 2003). While this example illustrates 
how a reduction in effort outside of games affects performance, the same idea can be 
applied to increases in effort.  
While some of the literature has used various individual statistics as dependent 
variables, virtually all of the research has ignored what different performance statistics 
reveal about how increased effort is manifested. To illustrate this point, imagine two 
small forwards: Player X and Player Y. In their respective contract years, Player X’s 
shooting percentage increases significantly, while Player Y’s rebounding rate increases. 
Since shooting percentage is based more on skill than on effort, it follows that Player X’s 
boost in effort was likely reflected in more hard work outside of games. Player X 
presumably spent extra time in the offseason working on his shooting or took more shots 
in practice in order to prepare for games. On the other hand, rebounding is more closely 
tied to effort and physical fitness. Player Y’s increase in rebounding proficiency could be 
either a result of increased effort during games, which would directly increase his 
rebounding output, or working harder on his physical conditioning in the offseason, 
which would allow him to put forth more effort during games and therefore grab more 
rebounds. Although Jean (2010) and Stiroh (2007) used a variety of individual statistics 
as dependent variables they did not consider the implications on how a change in effort 
level is expressed. Both Jean (2010) and Stiroh (2007) implicitly assumed that changes in 
effort were universally expressed the same way for all players. The bulk of research on 
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strategic behavior in the NBA focuses on a composite performance measure, which is 
appropriate for analyzing general performance but clouds the deductive power of 
individual statistics.3  
Another reason why the NBA was chosen as the research area for this paper was 
the prevalence of long-term guaranteed contracts and scarcity of performance-based 
incentives. The possibility of obtaining a long-term contract provides an ideal setting to 
study strategic behavior. The financial incentives to perform well are tremendous, as 
performance in the last year of a player’s contract can generate a substantial guaranteed 
contract for the future. Furthermore, performance-based incentives are not used 
frequently and are generally limited to 25% of a player’s contract value (Heubeck & 
Scheuer, 2003). This limits financial incentives during the remainder of the contract cycle 
(other than incentives to engage in shirking behavior in the year after signing a long term 
contract). The lack of financial incentives in other years allows researchers to tease out 
the individual effect of how added incentives in the contract year influence performance. 
On the other hand, NFL contract structures are laden with performance incentives, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of revealing any strategic behavior.  
Compared to baseball or football players, basketball players undoubtedly have a 
greater impact on the game. Basketball teams are much smaller, which allows each player 
to have a greater influence on the outcome of the game. Moreover, each player is 
continuously influencing the game on both offense and defense. This is very different 
than baseball, where each player only directly participates for a fraction of the time, and 
football, where the vast majority of players just play offense or defense. As such, out of 
3 The performance measure used in contract year phenomenon research varies, but tends to either be the 
NBA efficiency measure or a calculation of marginal productivity. Both will be discussed in depth in the 
literature review section.  5  
                                                        
 
the three major professional American sports, individual player performance in basketball 
has the greatest impact on outcome. Since effort level is related to performance, the 
existence of strategic behavior is incredibly important in the NBA. Moreover, NBA 
general managers must analyze players’ performance to decide whether or not to sign 
players to long-term contracts. In order to do so they must assess a player’s value and 
anticipate how they will perform in the future. Since we have established that each player 
has a crucial role in determining wins and losses, each general manager decision has 
great significance. It would be extremely helpful for NBA front offices to know that 
performance might be artificially inflated in the last year of the contract before deciding 
to sign a player to an expensive long-term contract.   
2. Literature Review  
The history of the contract year phenomenon is riddled with anecdotal evidence of 
professional athletes who have had monster statistical seasons in the last year of their 
contract. Furthermore, in the bulk of these cases the players regress back to their average 
performance (or worse) the following year. The most commonly cited example in the 
NBA is Erick Dampier (Engber, 2012). In the last year of his contract with the Golden 
State Warriors, Dampier’s rebounding totals per game skyrocketed from 6.6 to 12 and his 
points per game increased by 50%. The following year however, after signing a long-
term contract with the Dallas Mavericks, Dampier’s totals returned almost completely to 
his pre-contract year numbers. Despite this anecdote from the NBA, the majority of 
studies analyzing the relationship between effort and contract structure use data from 
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Major League Baseball (MLB), which has contracts that generally include more 
incentives and bonuses (Rice & Sen, 2008).  
While individual examples are appealing, the empirical evidence for the contract 
year effect as a whole is inconclusive. Some studies have found that professional athletes 
do strategically alter their effort level to optimize their financial gain from contracts 
(Lehn, 1982; Scoggins, 1993; Stiroh 2007) while others find a definite lack of strategic 
behavior (Krautmann, 1990; Maxcy, 1997; Maxcy, Krautmann & Fort, 2002). One of the 
underlying reasons for this discrepancy lies in the differences in modeling player 
performance. Multiple studies have uncovered contradictory evidence depending on the 
player performance model used (Berri and Krautmann, 2006; Krautmann & Donley, 
2009). In exploring shirking behavior in the NBA, Berri and Krautmann (2006) explored 
two separate models of player performance. The first of these models is similar to that of 
Stiroh (2007) in that a player’s performance is measured by total performance statistics 
like points, rebounds and steals. However, as Berri and Krautmann noted, their first 
model (which is based on the NBA’s performance measure) fails in a number of specific 
ways.4 First it does not adjust for playing time. Second, it does not provide weights for 
each statistic, which would indicate that an assist is worth the same as a point. However, 
assists always generate two or three points for the team.  
Berri and Krautmann’s alternative method builds off the work performed by 
Scully (1974) and involves computing the marginal product. Each individual statistic is 
measured not simply by its total but by the marginal value it adds to the team. Berri and 
Krautmann’s (2006) conclusion varied considerably depending on which performance 
4 The NBA efficiency measure = (pts + reb + ast + stl + blk – missed fg – missed ft – to)/gm 7  
                                                        
 
measure was used. These results indicate the importance of using a reliable measure of 
player performance when analyzing the contract year phenomenon.  
While many papers have explored the disincentives involved directly after a long 
term contract is signed, relatively little research has concentrated on how the prospect of 
an expiring contract influences performance and effort (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). In 
order to provide more research in this area of the literature, this paper looks exclusively at 
over performance in the final year of a contract.  
Despite narrowing the field of research to ex ante strategic behavior, previous 
studies still have yet to come to a reliable conclusion supporting or disproving over 
performance in the contract year across sports. Some research has rejected the existence 
of ex ante strategic behavior (Maxcy, Fort & Krautmann, 2002) while other studies have 
found significant indicators of over performance in players’ contract year (Stiroh, 2007; 
Rice and Sen, 2008; Jean, 2010; Sen & Rice, 2011). However, it is important to note that 
Maxcy et al. used MLB data where all others used NBA data. Only when the research 
topic is confined to NBA players do all studies demonstrate significant ex ante 
performance increases.  
While most of the contract year effect literature makes convincing arguments for 
the existence of enhanced performance in the contract year, their work assumes the effect 
of the contract year is universally applied to all types of players (Stiroh 2007; Jean, 2010; 
Rice and Sen, 2008). Recently, a small portion of research has begun to examine whether 
the contract year phenomenon impacts some types of players more than others (Singer, 
2009; Sen and Rice, 2011). While these two studies have briefly touched on this topic, 
there is ample room for further research. Sen and Rice (2011) found that performance 
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fluctuations based on contract structure decrease with experience and are almost entirely 
mitigated when player experience reaches 10 years. This is due, in part, to shorter 
contracts being given to older players, whose future performance is expected to decrease. 
Another possible cause for this phenomenon is the fact that most of the players that are 
able to play in the NBA for 10 or more years were high-level players during their prime. 
By virtue of being elite players, they likely obtained lucrative contracts and may be less 
susceptible to financial incentives as a result. In looking at contract year effects in the 
NFL, Singer (2009) performed a specialized regression by dividing the NFL player 
population into thirds based on performance. However, no significant effects were 
discovered likely because he found no sign of the contract year phenomenon in the NFL 
at all. These findings are likely a result of NFL contract structures, which, relative to the 
NBA and MLB, have smaller amounts guaranteed and are based more on performance 
incentives (Jean, 2010). In general, the NBA limits its performance incentives to a 
maximum of 25% of player salary and in most cases players’ contracts are almost entirely 
guaranteed (Heubeck & Scheuer, 2003). The guaranteed nature of contracts in the NBA 
provides fertile ground for strategic behavior.  
It is more than likely that contract year effects in the NBA are conditional on 
some levels other than experience. For example, it is conceivable that the very worst 
players in the NBA, who are scrounging for consistent playing time, would be giving 
maximum effort at all times. Since their effort is already at a maximum, the presence of 
financial incentives (or being in a contract year) would not boost effort any higher. This, 
however, is only one way to group players to explore the contract year phenomenon. 
There are many other possibilities for conditionality as well. For example, the presence of 
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a contract year could affect players differently based on their position. It is possible that 
centers and power forwards are more susceptible to the contract year effect than guards 
and small forwards. There are many possible explanations (behavioral and statistical) 
why this may be true, but the main point is that these types of variations have yet to be 
studied.  
Another area of weakness in this field is the use of advanced statistics. Most 
studies have used basic statistics (often the NBA efficiency measure or a slight variation 
of it) to calculate a composite measure of player performance (Stiroh, 2007; Rice & Sen, 
2008; Jean, 2010; Sen & Rice, 2011) While there is no inherent flaw in using basic 
statistics, there are other realms that ought to be explored and can give a more detailed 
picture of player performance. In the last few years, the NBA has undergone a statistical 
revolution, which has resulted in the creation of newer, more intricate player statistics to 
analyze a player’s impact on the game. Rather than focus solely on basic statistics like 
points, rebounds, assists, steals and blocks, this paper will include some of these 
advanced statistics like player efficiency rating (PER), total rebound percentage (TRB), 
win shares per 48 minutes (WS48), usage percentage (USG) and true shooting percentage 
(TS) (courtesy of Basketball-Reference.com).5  
5 Player Efficiency Rating (PER) is John Hollinger’s composite measure that attempts to include all of a 
player’s contributions into one rating. PER is an incredibly complex formula and more information on its 
calculation can be found at http://www.basketball-reference.com/about/per.html 
Total Rebound Percentage (TBR) is an estimate of the total percentage of available rebounds a player grabs 
while he is on the floor. 
Win Shares per 48 minutes (WS48) is an estimate of the number of wins a player contributes per 48 
minutes of playing time. 
Usage Percentage (USG) is an estimate of the percentage of team plays used by a player while he is on the 
floor. A play that is considered to be used is one that ends in the player taking a shot or committing a 
turnover. 
True Shooting Percentage (TS) is a measure of shooting efficiency that adjusts for the value of the shot 
being taken. For example, true shooting percentage weights three point shots differently than it would two 
point shots or free throws.  10  
                                                        
 
PER is a very general measure of player performance. One of the major critiques 
of PER is its emphasis on offense rather than defense. However, this is most likely due to 
the inherent lack of defensive statistics. Steals and blocks are the most frequently used 
defensive statistics and are nowhere near fully indicative of a player’s defensive 
performance. 
By analyzing the contract year phenomenon within player types and using 
advanced statistics, this paper aims to fill the gap in research that has been neglected thus 
far.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Data 
 The foundation for testing ex ante strategic behavior is based on comparing 
performance in a contract year to performance in all other years of the contract cycle. If 
the contract year phenomenon is real, we should see significantly increased performance 
during the last year of a player’s contract due to the added incentives of possibly being 
rewarded with a lucrative new contract.  The data for this paper was extracted from two primary sources: basketball-
reference.com and storytellerscontracts.info. The former provided all necessary player 
performance data while the latter provided player-specific contract information. The data 
provided was ideal because it provided advanced player performance statistics for the 
2012-2013 season and contract information detailed enough to distinguish between 
whether a team option was picked up before or after the completion of the 2012-2013 
season.6 
6 A team option gives the team the option to extend the player’s contract one more season. The timing of a 
team option is relevant because a player will be playing with an uncertain financial future until the team 11  
                                                        
 
3.1   Dependent Variables and Conditionality  
In order to measure many aspects of player performance, I collected data on a 
variety of individual performance statistics. The six statistics that I manipulated and used 
as dependent variables were PER, USG, TS, TRB, WS48 and field goal attempts per 36 
minutes (FGA36). This data was collected for every player who played in the 2012-2013 
season. For every player in all six statistical categories I also collected career averages. 
These career statistics serve as a baseline performance measure with which I compare 
their 2012-2013 statistics. To obtain a measure of over performance, I subtracted each 
player’s career average from his respective 2012-2013 statistic and then converted it into 
a percentage.7 Thus, if performance were to increase in the contract year, this percentage 
deviation from career average (PERdev) would be positive for players in the final year of 
their current contract.8  
Measuring over performance based on the deviation from a player’s career 
average is a novel method in the contract year phenomenon literature. Instead of 
comparing statistics across players, who have different career paths, the present method 
endogenously accounts for some individual player variability. 
3.2   Independent Variables and Controls 
 I was also able to collect my independent and control variables from basketball-
reference.com. The first obvious independent variable that I needed to collect was age. 
option is picked up. Thus, a player who’s team option is picked up prior to the 2012-2013 season will not 
be considered to be in a contract season and a player’s team option that is picked up after will be 
considered to be in a contract year. This topic will be discussed in more depth later in this paper. 
7 For example, if a player’s 2012-2013 PER was 11 and his career PER was 10, his new measure of over 
performance would be .1 or 10% ((11-10)/10).  
8 PERdev = PER deviation measure, USGdev = usage percentage deviation measure, TSdev = true shooting 
percentage deviation measure, TRBdev = total rebound percentage deviation measure, FGA36dev = field 
goals attempted per 36 minutes deviation measure, WS48dev = win shares per 48 minutes deviation 
measure  12  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Age is crucial in controlling for the expected difference between career performance and 
2012-2013-season performance. It is expected that older players will perform worse than 
their career averages due to physical deterioration and therefore must be accounted for.  
 Another variable for which it was necessary to control was teammate ability. 
Intuitively, if a player’s teammates are perennial all-stars then his role on the team will be 
diminished, likely impacting his performance in statistical categories like usage 
percentage and field goal attempts. Initially, winning percentage was used as a control for 
teammate ability. However, this is not entirely helpful because the player in question has 
some inherent ability to influence whether his team wins a game. For example, if a player 
performs well during a season and helps his team wins more games, his teammates are 
perceived as being better as well. Furthermore, since teammate ability is presumed to be 
negatively correlated with performance (in certain areas) this player who had a great 
season would be expected to have less of an impact on the game even though this was 
clearly not the case. To avoid this pitfall, a statistic called tmwins was created to measure 
team ability without the individual player by using win shares. Win shares by definition 
represent how many victories a player contributes to during the course of a season. 
Tmwins is the difference between total team win shares and the individual player’s win 
shares.9 Thus, the resulting total represents everyone on the team’s win share contribution 
other than the player in question.  
 It is important to also control for team and position characteristics. Each team has 
its own playing style, pace and system, which can shape a player’s performance to some 
degree. Some teams run offensive systems emphasizing the interior presence of dominant 
9 For example, if a player had 10 win shares during the 2012-2013 season and his team won 40 games, 
tmwins would equal 30. 13  
                                                        
 
post players while others focus on outside shooting. These types differences will 
undoubtedly have an effect on player performance and must be controlled for. Similarly, 
player characteristics vary widely by position as guards tend to attempt more perimeter 
shots and forwards and centers generally grab more rebounds. Dummy variables for team 
and position were included to account for these differences.  
 In terms of contract data, I collected whether or not a player was in the last year of 
his contract and contract length.10 Along with being in the final year of his current 
contract, a player was also considered to be in a contract year if his team option for the 
2013-2014 season was not picked up or if his team option was picked up after the 
completion of the 2012-2013season. The rationale behind this decision is based on the 
player’s contractual uncertainty for the 2012-2013 season. If a player has a team option 
for the 2013-2014 season that is not picked up, the 2012 -2013 season now has the added 
financial pressures of a contract year. Similarly, the 2012-2013 season has the added 
weight of contractual possibilities if the team option is picked up after the season’s 
completion.  
However, players who had a player option or early termination option (ETO) 
were not considered to be in a contract season.11 For these players, their contract situation 
for the next season was guaranteed unless they chose not to exercise their option. As a 
result, players with player options or ETO’s in 2013-2014 had financial security during 
2012-2013. At worst if they played poorly, they could count on a one year continuation 
10 For the purpose of measuring contract length, I did not include a team option or a player option as part of 
the contract. While options allow for the possibility of extending a contract for an extra season, they are not 
guaranteed and are thus not worth including. To illustrate this point, a player in a two-year contract with a 
player option for the third year would have a contract length of two years. 
11 A player option gives the player the option to extend his contract one more season. An early termination 
option gives the player the option to terminate his contract at the agreed upon date (usually 1 year prior to 
the contract’s conclusion) 14  
                                                        
 
of their current contract. However, for players with team options, these players must 
prove their worth to their team to have any contractual guarantee. A dummy variable was 
included to demonstrate if a player was determined to be in a contract year.  
Players were removed from the sample for various reasons. Rookies (first year 
players) were eliminated because their career average would simply match their 2012-
2013 output, thereby eliminating any performance deviation. Players who played less 
than 12 minutes per game or less than 30 games throughout the course of the season were 
removed to ensure accurate statistical evaluations of player performance. Finally, players 
with one-year contracts were also removed to ensure that all players were currently 
engaged in long-term contracts. After removing players that fell into any of these 
categories, 230 players remained in the sample.  
3.3   Data Limitations  
The major limitation with regards to my data is simply its quantity. Due to time 
restrictions and the tedious nature of manually collecting a large quantity of observations, 
I was only able to collect data for the 2012-2013 season. The vast majority of previous 
research used a large panel of data spanning greater than 10 years. As such, other studies’ 
conclusions are bound to be more robust simply due to the number of observations.  
Another drawback from this data limitation is the inability to control for injuries. 
Past research has used change in games played from one season to the next as a proxy for 
injury. Having one season of data makes this type of proxy impossible to calculate.  
3.4   Simple Data Analysis 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Contract Data           
Contract 
Length 230 3.36 1.24 2 6 
dum_conyr 230 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Player Data           
Age 230 27.07 3.97 20 39 
Tmwins 230 39.64 13.18 10.7 66 
Career PER 230 15.41 3.44 7.9 27.6 
  Table 1 gives the summary statistics divided into contract data and player data for 
all players in the sample. The contract data only reflects those players with multi-year 
contracts, thus the minimum contract length is two years. The variable “dum_conyr” 
represents the contract year dummy variable. The longest contract in the dataset is 6 years 
and was shared by 11 players. The mean contract length is 3.36 years with a standard 
deviation of 1.24 years. Approximately 24% of the players included in my analysis are in 
a contract season.  
 The average career PER is just over 15, which is consistent with the league 
average because PER is adjusted each season so the mean is 15. After dropping players 
who played less than 12 minutes a game (likely players with low career PER’s) it makes 
sense that PER is slightly above league average.  
 Prior to performing any regression analysis I analyzed the basic correlations 
between each of my dependent variables and the contract year dummy variable. Table 2 
displays the results of these correlations.  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 PERdev USGdev TRBdev TSdev FGA36dev WS48dev dum_conyr 
PERdev 1.00       
USGdev 0.67 1.00      
TRBdev 0.27 0.04 1.00     
TSdev 0.60 0.08 0.11 1.00    
FGA36dev 0.64 0.96 -0.01 0.04 1.00   
WS48dev 0.40 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.08 1.00  
dum_conyr -0.06 -0.13 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 1.00 
 
Table 2 gives the correlation matrix between all measures of performance and the 
contract year dummy variable. The most striking outcome here is the sign on the 
correlation coefficients. One would expect the presence of a contract year—and added 
financial incentives—to boost performance. However, five of the six coefficients are 
negative, hinting at the possibility of negative contract year effects. While there are 
obviously no controls in this correlation and thus these results are not conclusive, they are 
noteworthy in that they represent the first time that underperformance in a contract 
season is considered.  
 
4.   Empirical Specification 
 This section specifies the regression model used in testing for over performance in 
the contract year. In doing so, I will explain the reasoning behind my model and analyze 
its benefits and drawbacks. In order to determine performance deviation from career 
averages I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model of the following form 
Pi = β0  + β1dum_conyr + β2Age + β3tmwins + α µ + αp + εI                                               (1) 
where P represents the measure of performance used. Since I have multiple dependent 
variables for which I test for performance deviations, P represents PERdev, USGdev, 
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TRBdev, TSdev, FGA36dev, or WS48dev. Thus, six models are estimated using 
Equation (1). Dum_conyr is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a player is 
in the last year of his current contract during the 2012-2013 season. Age is the age of 
players in years and tmwins is a team’s total number of win shares minus the player in 
question’s win shares. The α’s correspond to team and position dummy variables 
respectively to control for unobserved team and position effects while εi is an error term 
of the usual properties. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
One of the strengths of this model is that it captures the basic observable inputs 
with regards to the variables that impact player performance. Moreover, the addition of 
tmwins into the regression model explores an important aspect for which previous NBA 
research has failed to account. While some research dedicated to shirking in MLB used 
total team wins to control for teammate ability (Berri & Krautmann, 2006), empirical 
testing in the NBA has largely ignored this concern. When using total team wins, 
however, the issue of attributing teammate performance to the individual player arises. 
Using total teammate win shares to account for teammate quality solves this 
misattribution problem. Tmwins is a novel idea in exploring the contract year 
phenomenon and is a definite strength of the model detailed in Equation (1). 
Figure 1 (below) represents the relationship between PER in the 2012-2013 
season and career PER across different ages. Intuitively, it makes sense that younger 
players will over perform relative to their career averages as they gain playing experience 
and knowledge. Likewise, older players are expected to perform worse than their career 
averages because of the cumulative nature of nagging injuries as well as declining 
athleticism. Once they reach a certain age, the drawbacks of physical deterioration begin 
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to outweigh the benefits of experience. In this sample, players on average reach this point 
between the ages of 26 and 27 (The approximate age where PERdev equals zero). The 
graph depicted in Figure 1 demonstrates the importance of controlling for age when 
analyzing the contract year phenomenon.  
Figure 1: PERdev and Age Scatterplot with Line Fit 
 
As mentioned earlier, the limited quantity of data eliminates my ability to control 
for player injury. Since I only have one year’s worth of observations, I cannot control for 
injury in the conventional way, which involves calculating the difference in games played 
from one season to the next. This is a weakness in my model that derives not from 
methodology but rather from lack of data. 
 
5.   Results  
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The results section will first examine the regression analysis for each performance 
measure for the entire sample. Then in order to explore some of the conditionality that 
likely inhabits the contract year effect, the data will be divided in a few specific ways. 
First, the dataset will be divided in thirds by age in order to explore any possible 
differences in contract year performance due to age. To create roughly even numbered 
groups, players are separated into three categories: low age (24 years or younger), mid 
age (25 to 28 years) and old age (29 years or older). Second, I will divide my sample by 
career PER in thirds in order to differentiate by player quality: low PER (13.7 or less), 
mid PER (13.8 to 16.5) and high PER (16.6 or greater). Lastly, I will divide the sample 
between guards and post players in the hopes of finding different contract year effects 
between positions.12 Ideally, I would separate my dataset by all five positions but my 
limited amount of data is too restrictive to perform such specific analysis.  
In my empirical testing, I used regression analysis for each of the six measures of 
performance by each of the three aforementioned data subsets. As such, there is too much 
output to include in this paper. I will include tables and analysis for all regressions where 
the coefficient on the contract year dummy variable is significant and any other findings 
that are sufficiently interesting. The team and position effects are excluded from the 
results tables for space purposes. It is important to note that the same base regression 
model exhibited in Equation (1) will be used to analyze the data when the sample is 
divided. 
  
 
12 Guards refers to point guards and shooting guards, while post players includes small forwards, power 
forwards and centers 20  
                                                        
 
Table 3: Regressions on Entire Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PERdev USGdev TRBdev 
dum_conyr -0.0213 -0.286 0.307 
 (-0.01) (-0.77) (1.51) 
    
Age -1.685*** -0.266*** -0.0251 
 (-7.70) (-6.76) (-1.10) 
    
tmwins -0.333*** -0.0175 -0.0117 
 (-2.93) (-0.79) (-0.95) 
N 230 230 230 
adj. R2 0.228 0.250 -0.028 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TSdev FGA36dev WS48dev 
dum_conyr -0.941* -0.140 -0.00163 
 (-1.71) (-0.58) (-0.14) 
    
Age -0.184*** -0.137*** -0.00407*** 
 (-3.05) (-5.42) (-3.77) 
    
tmwins -0.0722*** -0.0124 -0.00264** 
 (-2.96) (-0.92) (-2.06) 
N 230 230 230 
adj. R2 0.128 0.216 0.138 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  Table 3 reports the results of my base regression for all measures of performance 
for the entire sample. Each coefficient has the same sign as the correlation matrix in 
Table 2. Given that those coefficients are rather weak, it is not surprising that only one 
significant result is found in this test. As demonstrated above, only the coefficient on 
dum_conyr for TSdev is significant. Moreover, the coefficient is negative, which means 
that true shooting percentage decreases in the presence of a contract season. More 
specifically, this model asserts that players’ true shooting percentage will decline by 21  
 
.94% in the presence of a contract year. This result is the first evidence of significant 
underperformance in a contract season. All previous research has pointed to either no 
change in performance or over performance in a contract year. However, this is the first 
study that has analyzed shooting accuracy.  
 As I have discussed previously, it is arguable whether working harder in a game 
allows a player to make more jump shots. However, if effort manifested itself in 
offseason workouts or extra practice time, it is possible that shooting accuracy could 
increase. Given that true shooting percentage declines when effort increases (in a contract 
year) it seems likely that some changes in effort are expressed during games. Moreover, a 
significant rise in effort appears to have a negative impact on shooting ability. After 
discovering that players shooting percentages decreased in contract seasons, I assumed 
that it was a result of overshooting; in trying to prove themselves to be valuable assets to 
a team, players were taking bad shots, thereby driving down their percentages. However, 
FGA36 does not show significant increases in a contract year, illustrating that players do 
not shoot more in a contract year.  
Another interesting conclusion from this regression is the utter lack of 
significance for PERdev. Considering that all previous research on the contract year 
phenomenon in the NBA has demonstrated the existence of ex ante strategic behavior 
using composite measures of performance, it would make sense that PER (being a 
composite measure as well) would also exhibit over performance in the presence of a 
contract year. However, this is not the case as PERdev is far from being significantly 
different from zero. These results further the inconclusive nature of research on the 
contract year phenomenon because they are so divergent from the research. However, it 
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is possible that the 2012-2013 season was an aberration in terms of player performance 
for players in contract seasons. While this is a possibility, this paper’s outcome should 
not be dismissed, as the body of research on this topic is not nearly thorough enough to 
discard any results simply on the basis that they contradict the existing literature.  
 The coefficient on age is negative in all cases and significant at the 1% level for 
each performance measure except TRBdev. This result is consistent with previous 
research that has demonstrated that age and performance are inversely correlated. 
However, it is interesting that TRB had the least amount of age effects. This suggests the 
possibility that rebounding may not be as strongly correlated with physical condition as I 
previously assumed since the major change as players’ age is deterioration of physical 
capabilities. Perhaps positioning or instinct plays a larger role in TRB than expected.  
These results suggest that players are not performing better in the last year of their 
contract and by some measurements, are actually performing worse. However, this does 
not necessarily imply that players are giving less effort. 
5.1   Usage Percentage 
 While usage percentage in the 2012-2013 season did not significantly deviate 
from career levels when considering all players, significant results emerged once the 
dataset was divided in thirds by age.  
 
 
 
 
 
23  
 
5.1.1   Age 
Table 4: Usage Percentage by Age 
 (≤ 24) (25 ≥ 28) (≥ 29) 
 USGdev USGdev USGdev 
dum_conyr -3.041*** 0.409 -0.0823 
 (-3.18) (0.70) (-0.09) 
    
tmwins 0.0584 0.00973 0.0406 
 (1.31) (0.34) (0.65) 
    
Age 0.280 -0.506* -0.398** 
 (0.82) (-1.91) (-2.53) 
N 70 86 74 
adj. R2 0.052 0.311 0.124 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 The three models in Table 4 (above) represent the young, middle and old age 
groups respectively, using the same base regression model. For the young age group, 
dum_conyr is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that young players’ 
usage percentage decreases in the presence of a contract year. One might expect that 
younger players trying to make an impact and demonstrate their potential would attempt 
more shots and try to make more plays (possibly resulting in more turnovers) in a 
contract year, thereby boosting their USG. However these results suggest that younger 
players actually reduce their USG in the last year of their contracts. Since USG is a 
measurement of a players shot attempts and turnovers when he is on the floor, a change 
in USG can be either a product of limiting turnovers, decreasing shot attempts or some 
combination of both. While I cannot know definitively with this one statistic, by 
analyzing the change in FGA36 later in this paper, I aim to specify whether decreasing 
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shot attempts or turnovers causes the change in USG for young players in a contract 
season.  
It is important to extract this difference because there are two different 
interpretations of decreasing USG. Limiting turnovers is a crucial sign regarding the 
continued advancement of young players, while increased field goal attempts can be a 
sign of immaturity if a young player is forcing shots to satisfy his ego.13 Thus, for general 
managers making personnel decisions, it is extremely important to know whether 
younger players tend to decrease their field goal attempts or turnovers in their contract 
season.  
Moreover, while the coefficients are not significant for the middle and old age 
groups, they are positive. This broad discrepancy further supports the notion that the 
prospect of an upcoming contract year affects young players much differently than older 
players in terms of their usage percentage.  
5.2   Total Rebound Percentage 
 While not significant for the entire dataset, TRB demonstrated some interesting 
results for different subsamples.  
5.2.1   Forwards/Centers vs. Guards 
 The results in Table 5 demonstrate that post players increase their rebounding 
output in the presence of a contract season. More specifically, small forwards, power 
forwards and centers as a group increase their total rebounding percentage by .7% when 
in the last year of their contract. That is, post players grab .7% more rebounds during 
13 Obviously, increased field goal attempts can also be a result of better performance and thus, more 
offensive responsibility. However, decreased turnovers are unambiguously a positive sign, whereas inflated 
shot attempts must be interpreted as being positive or negative based on context and situation. 25  
                                                        
 
their time on the floor when they are in the last year of their contract relative to non-
contract seasons.  
  
Table 5: Total Rebound Percentage by Position 
 (Forwards/Center) (Guards) 
 TRBdev TRBdev 
dum_conyr 0.698** -0.218 
 (2.01) (-1.19) 
   
Age -0.0361 -0.0265 
 (-0.86) (-1.35) 
   
tmwins -0.0139 -0.00555 
 (-0.86) (-0.54) 
N 138 92 
adj. R2 -0.000 0.036 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 On the other hand, point and shooting guards’ TRBDEV does not significantly 
differ from zero. Furthermore, the coefficient is negative, and while not significant, it is 
in stark contrast to the positive statistic demonstrated by post players. This discrepancy 
gives further credence to evidence of conditionality effects.  
 Intuitively, it makes sense for TRB to increase more for post players than it does 
for guards. Rebounding is inherently a more important statistic for post players and more 
of their overall performance evaluation is based on their rebounding ability. For other 
positions (point and shooting guards) rebounding does not play as big of a role in overall 
performance. As a result, it follows that post players in a contract year—who are looking 
to demonstrate their overall capabilities to potential suitors—focus their efforts on 
statistics that make up a greater proportion of their value. This effort can manifest itself 
either in offseason conditioning or in game effort level. However, the important inference 26  
 
here is that players are prone to working harder in areas of their game that has a greater 
impact on their value and thus, their future salary. 
5.2.2   Career PER  
 The regression output in Table 6 indicates that there are significant differences in 
TRBdev between players of different career PER. Models (1) through (3) represent 
players with low, middle and high career PER respectively. The coefficient on model (2) 
is significant and positive, demonstrating that average players grab a higher percentage of 
rebounds during their time on the floor when they are in a contract season. More 
specifically, their TRB increases by 1.3% when they are in the final season of their 
current contract relative to non-contract years. 
Table 6: Total Rebound Percentage by Career PER 
 (≤ 13.7) (13.8 ≥ 16.5) (≥ 16.6) 
 TRBdev TRBdev TRBdev 
dum_conyr -0.0570 1.298* -0.0895 
 (-0.19) (1.69) (-0.24) 
    
Age -0.0533 -0.0705 0.00319 
 (-1.08) (-1.10) (0.08) 
    
tmwins -0.0275 0.00918 -0.0417** 
 (-1.11) (0.33) (-2.56) 
N 78 76 76 
adj. R2 0.075 -0.143 -0.069 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
My first instinct was that perhaps more average players are post players; therefore 
position would be the reason for their improvement rather than player quality (given the 
results in Table 5). Especially since the significance is only at the 10% threshold, it 
seemed possible that post players dominated the sample and caused this outcome. 
However, only roughly 16% of the players in the middle career PER section are centers 
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while point guards, shooting guards, small forwards and power forwards each represent 
approximately 21% of the group. Thus, this result is independent of any position related 
effects. 
It is possible that historically average players are more likely to be susceptible to 
contract year effects for a few reasons. First, they have more financial incentives than 
elite players. The upper third of players (in terms of career PER) are likely to have other 
sources of income to supplement their current salary. Elite players usually have 
endorsement deals with clothing companies and act in many commercials. These 
additional—and quite substantial—sources of income could lessen the impact that 
financial incentives have on their effort level. Second, players with high career PER’s are 
generally older and thus, likely to have already secured at least one lucrative long-term 
contract due, not only to their age, but their continued high performance. In my dataset, 
the average age of high career PER players is 28.2, while the average age of middle and 
low career PER players is 25.5. This makes sense because players must be very talented 
and successful to continue to be able to compete at a high level while their body 
physically wears down. Third, the low career PER group has likely been constantly 
working hard to receive playing time and carve out a significant role on their team. As a 
result, these types of players have been giving maximum effort and added financial 
incentives may not allow them to work any harder.  
These three reasons demonstrate why elite and below average players might be 
less susceptible to the contract year effect. As such, the results—illustrated in Table 6—
support the idea that financial incentives increase effort more in average players.  
5.2.3   Age  
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 The results in Table 7 show that older players rebound significantly better in the 
presence of a contract year. More specifically, their TRB increases by almost 1% in the 
last year of their contract.  
 Table 7: Total Rebound Percentage by Age 
 (≤ 24) (25 ≥ 28) (≥ 29) 
 TRBdev TRBdev TRBdev 
dum_conyr -0.177 0.544 0.965* 
 (-0.19) (1.51) (1.95) 
    
Age -0.186 -0.484 0.0173 
 (-1.28) (-1.54) (0.23) 
    
tmwins 0.0217 -0.0307 0.00139 
 (0.85) (-1.25) (0.05) 
N 70 86 74 
adj. R2 -0.111 0.103 -0.213 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 These results appear to contradict the research of Rice and Sen (2011), which 
asserts that the contract year effect vanishes once players reach 10 years of experience. 
However, Rice and Sen (2011) used the NBA efficiency measure as their dependent 
variable, which takes a multitude of other statistics into account. It is possible that 
rebounding is unique and that older players rebound better in the final year of their 
contract.  
5.3   True Shooting Percentage 
 While TSdev is significant for the entire sample, some interesting results also 
show up when the sample is divided. 
5.3.1   Forwards/Centers vs. Guards 
 Table 8 (below) represents TSdev when the sample is divided between positions. 
Model (1) represents point guards and shooting guards and model (2) contains only small 
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forwards, power forwards and centers. The results of this regression, illustrated in Table 
8, demonstrate that TSdev is negative and significant at the 1% level for the guards sub 
sample. More specifically, this model predicts a 2.21% decrease in true shooting 
percentage for point guards and shooting guards when they enter the final year of their 
contract.  
Table 8: True Shooting Percentage by Position 
 (Guards) (Forwards/Center) 
 TSdev TSdev 
dum_conyr -2.221*** 0.239 
 (-3.34) (0.32) 
   
Age -0.0131 -0.269*** 
 (-0.17) (-2.95) 
   
tmwins -0.0879** -0.0804** 
 (-2.49) (-2.58) 
N 92 138 
adj. R2 0.276 0.106 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 Similar to the general regression run earlier, TS has a negative and significant 
coefficient, which enhances the notion that underperformance (for some player subsets) 
in a contract year, exists. As mentioned previously, overshooting does not seem to cause 
the drop in TS, because FGA36 does not significantly increase. This discrepancy in 
shooting percentage between guards and post players during their contract year most 
likely stems from the types of shots taken in the course of a game. Guards, by nature, 
attempt more long range jump shots, while post players take the majority of their shots 
close to the basket. For longer distance shots, a smaller change in a player’s form, rhythm 
or footwork leads to a bigger alteration in outcome since the basketball is in the air for a 
longer period. As such a 25 foot jump shot is more responsive to changes than say a 6 
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foot jump hook. Thus, it is possible that the increase that results from a contract year has 
just enough of an impact on some aspect of shooting to where it affects only long range 
shots and not closer shots. 
On the other hand, forwards and centers showed no significant change in their 
true shooting percentage. This sample subset clearly illustrates that guards weighed down 
the TSdev regression for all players, causing it to be negative and significant. This is a 
great example of why conditionality is such an important topic to explore with regards to 
the contract year phenomenon. As I have demonstrated, individual subsamples can be 
more susceptible to certain effects. If that effect is strong enough to weigh down the 
entire sample, the researcher may incorrectly conclude that the effect is universal across 
all player types. As this example indicates, how a contract year alters performance is not 
always the same for all players because different player subsets are likely to have varying 
responses to financial incentives. 
5.3.2   Age 
 In Table 9 (below), models (1) through (3) are subsamples of the larger dataset 
divided into three categories: young, middle and old respectively. Table 9 demonstrates 
that dum_conyr is significant at the 10% level for both young and old players. The results 
of this regression assert that, in a contract year, younger players’ true shooting percentage 
increases by 2.25% while older players’ true shooting percentage decreases by 2.81%. 
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Table 9: True Shooting Percentage by Age 
 (≤ 24) (25 ≥ 28) (≥ 29) 
 TSdev TSdev TSdev 
dum_conyr 2.249* -0.468 -2.806* 
 (1.87) (-0.53) (-1.71) 
    
Age -0.321 -0.349 -0.179 
 (-0.78) (-0.87) (-0.68) 
    
tmwins -0.0902* -0.0286 0.0433 
 (-1.87) (-0.80) (0.55) 
N 70 86 74 
adj. R2 0.205 -0.049 0.219 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
This regression very clearly demonstrates that the presence of a contract year has 
disparate effects depending on player type. In this case, the presence of a contract year 
causes true shooting percentage to go in opposite directions for younger and older 
players. These results again illustrate the importance of conditionality. The detailed 
differences and nuances between age groups would be left undiscovered if regression 
analysis were performed only on the dataset as a whole.  
5.4   Field Goal Attempts per 36 Minutes 
 Although FGA36dev was not significant for the entire sample, when divided into 
subsamples, some interesting results appear. 
5.4.1   Age 
 In Table 10 (below) the three models illustrate the regression results of 
FGA36dev when the sample is separated into young, middle, and old players 
respectively.  
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Table 10: Field Goal Attempts per 36 Minutes by Age  
 (≤ 24) (25 ≥ 28) (≥ 29) 
 FGA36dev FGA36dev FGA36dev 
dum_conyr -1.633** 0.136 0.0362 
 (-2.36) (0.41) (0.07) 
    
tmwins 0.0278 0.00256 0.0237 
 (1.09) (0.13) (0.69) 
    
Age 0.223 -0.268* -0.235** 
 (1.13) (-1.70) (-2.30) 
N 70 86 74 
adj. R2 0.044 0.308 0.195 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
These results shed light on the previous analysis using USGdev as the dependent 
variable. When the population was divided into thirds by age, USG for young players 
decreased significantly in the contract year. Since USG is a product of both turnovers and 
shot attempts, I was unsure whether players were shooting less or committing fewer 
turnovers. Model (1) in Table 10 allows us to conclude that young players shoot less in 
their contract year. Whether this is a result of better shot selection or decreasing scoring 
responsibility (caused by poor performance) is up for debate. However, the idea is that 
younger players may be using greater judgment in choosing which shots to take. This 
notion is furthered by the results in Table 9, which show that young players’ TS increases 
during a contract year. These two results together suggest that young players are 
eliminating bad shots in their contract year, thereby raising their accuracy and lowering 
the number of shots taken. This result is especially interesting given the stereotype that 
younger players are less coachable, eager to shoot the ball and more prone to engage in 
poor shot selection. 
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6.   Conclusion 
Understanding the contract year phenomenon is an important topic for NBA 
franchises because its existence causes systematic alterations in performance. Since NBA 
front offices have to make player personnel decisions based on observed performance 
(likely using statistics to inform their decision to some degree), grasping how financial 
incentives impact on-court behavior is crucial. Moreover, this paper demonstrates that 
performance is likely to deviate in the last year of a player’s current contract, which is 
likely when performance is being most heavily scrutinized.14 As a result, how the 
presence of a contract year effects performance is an important topic for NBA general 
managers to consider during their evaluation process.  
The results derived from this paper’s regression analysis diverge significantly 
from the literature on the NBA contract year phenomenon. While one may be quick to 
blame the lack of data as the cause for this discrepancy, this paper looks at ex ante 
strategic behavior from a different perspective and uses different analysis techniques, 
thus it makes sense that its results are somewhat different.  
The conclusions specified in this paper are by no means an end all answer to the 
specifics of the contract year phenomenon, however this paper adds to the existing 
literature in many ways. It provides a new measurement of teammate performance 
(tmwins), which is based on win shares rather than win totals and avoids accounting for 
the player in question’s performance. This paper also formally introduces the idea of 
conditionality effects, that is, how different subsets of players react to the presence of a 
contract year. These subsets include age, position and historical performance (measured 
14 Stiroh (2007) demonstrated that salary is more heavily weighted on contract year performance than any 
other year, thus it seems probable that NBA general managers’ performance analysis tends to do the same.  34  
                                                        
 
by career PER). Moreover, this paper provides the first statistical evidence of 
underperformance in a contract year. Underperformance was discovered in true shooting 
percentage, usage percentage and field goal attempts per 36 minutes. However, the 
present study should be replicated with a bigger sample to ensure its validity. 
Since the literature on the contract year phenomenon in the NBA is limited and 
lacking in creative approaches, there are many possible future studies to consider. It 
would be interesting to divide the sample into groups by each position types rather than 
by guards and post players in order to undergo a more detailed analysis of position 
effects. Another possible study would involve analyzing assist rates to see if guards 
increase their percentages more than post players. This would be similar to post players 
increasing their total rebound percentage more than guards and would further suggest that 
players tend to boost performance in areas that more strongly correlate to their market 
value. While this paper dealt exclusively with ex ante strategic behavior in the NBA, 
future research should incorporate conditionality and advanced statistics into research 
examining other sports and ex post opportunistic behavior.  
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